

Approved For Release 2003/08/18 : CIA-RDP80B01676R001100070038-4

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16 August 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Patrick Coyne *card*
 NSC Representative for Internal Security
 Room 306, Executive Office Building

SUBJECT: Clandestine Listening Devices

I concur in your draft directive of 31 July 1956
 concerning a proposed NSC Special Committee on Technical
 Surveillance Countermeasures.

~~SECRET~~ SIGNED

C. P. CABELL
 Lieutenant General, USAF
 Deputy Director

OS [] (9 Aug 56)
 RETYPED: O/DDCI/JSE:km (Not DDCI signature) (16 Aug 56)

Orig & 1 - Addressee (Delivered by ER - 8/16/56)

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CONCUR:

Sqd/H. Gates Lloyd -
 Asst DD/S - 16 Aug 56

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NSC

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DDO 56-2852A

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2-7045a

MEMORANDUM FOR: J. Patrick Coyne
NSC Representative for Internal
Security
Room 386, Executive Office
Building
Washington, D. C.

SUBJECT : Clandestine Listening Devices

I concur in your draft directive of 31 July 1956 concern-
ing a proposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveil-
lance Countermeasures.

ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

Distribution:

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CONCUR:

OS/DD/PPS/1
(9 Aug 56)

H. Gates Lloyd
Acting Deputy Director
(Support)
16 Aug 56


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ER 8-5641

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10 AUG 1956



MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : Proposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures

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1. This memorandum contains a recommendation submitted for DCI approval. Such recommendation is contained in paragraph 5.

2. For the past several months, representatives of the FBI, OSI, G-2, ONI, State and this office have been meeting as an Ad Hoc Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative for Internal Security. The purpose of these meetings has been to develop recommendations on the subject of clandestine listening devices as a result of a memorandum from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, and from Secretary of Defense to the National Security Council pointing out the need for a focal point for the receipt of all information pertinent to the development of a national integrated program of countermeasures to the security threat posed by clandestine listening devices.

3. The Ad Hoc Committee recommends the establishment of an NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures with a charter as shown in the attached draft (TAB C). This draft is a revised version of a charter which started out by proposing an NSC Committee on Counterintelligence but which your representative, upon the continuing advice of Deputy Director (Plans), strongly objected to as being outside the scope of this group. TAB B is a proposed memorandum from Mr. Coyne to the Executive Secretary, NSC for our information. TAB A is a memorandum of transmittal from Mr. Coyne to CIA.

ER Copy - via Reading

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SUBJECT: Proposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.

4. General Truscott has been kept informed on the discussions and feeling of the Committee members with respect to the need for a national counterintelligence policy. The Deputy Director (Plans) has been briefed on the discussions of this Ad Hoc Committee in the field of counterintelligence and countermeasures and concurs in the proposed NSC Committee and its charter.

5. It is recommended that you concur in the establishment of this special committee and its charter by signing the attached concurrence memorandum.

Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

Enclosures:

1. Memo to Mr. Coyne
fr ^DDCI, Subj: Clandestine Listening Devices.
(ER 8-5394/a - sgd by DDCI-8/16)
2. TAB A. Memo of Transmittal fr Mr. Coyne to CIA dtd 7 Aug.
3. TAB B. Proposed Memo fr Mr. Coyne to Exec Sec. NSC, undtd.
4. TAB C Charter, dtd 31 Jul.

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TAB A

ER 8-5394

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August 7, 1956

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Security, Department of State
The Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Special Operations)
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Department of Justice
The Director of Intelligence, Department
of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department
of the Navy
The Director of Special Investigations, Depart-
ment of the Air Force
The Director of the National Security Agency

SUBJECT: Clandestine Listening Devices

In an outgrowth of meetings recently held with your repre-
sentatives the following documents are enclosed:

1. Undated memorandum to be submitted to the Executive Secretary, NSC, by the writer.
2. Draft directive of July 31, 1956 concerning a proposed NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures.

The first enclosure is forwarded for informational purposes and will be utilized in transmitting the draft directive of July 31, 1956 to the Executive Secretary, NSC.

The second enclosure was unanimously approved by your representatives (names listed below) at a meeting held in this office on July 31, 1956. In line with an understanding reached at that meeting, however, the second enclosure is being forwarded to you with for formal concurrence by you prior to submitting it to the Executive Secretary, NSC.

It is requested that your comments on the draft directive of July 31, 1956 be furnished to this office by August 15, 1956. In the event you concur in the draft directive proposed by your representatives it will thereupon be submitted to the Executive

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Secretary. In the event proposed changes in the draft directive are recommended by any of the addressees of this memorandum, all will be notified thereof in order that such changes may be jointly considered by you prior to the submission to the Council of a draft directive on the subject.

J. Patrick Coyne
J. Patrick Coyne

cc: Mr. William L. Wanne -- State
Mr. Robert E. Drake -- ASD (OSO)
Colonel Sheffield Edwards -- CIA
Mr. Graham A. Day -- FBI
Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Downie -- G-2
Commander J.O. Johnson -- INI
Mr. Gilbert R. Levy -- OSI

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TAB B

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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C.

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JAMES E. LAY, JR., EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

SUBJECT: Clandestine Listening Devices

REFERENCE: Memorandum for the Executive Secretary, NSC
dated May 28, 1956, from the Secretary of Defense

1. In the referenced memorandum the Secretary of Defense:
(a) concurred in the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendation that
a group be created directly under the National Security Council
to serve as a focal point for the receipt of all information
pertinent to the development of a national integrated program
of countermeasures to the security threat posed by clandestine
listening devices; (b) requested that action be initiated by
you looking to meeting the substance of the JCS recommendation.
Pursuant thereto, and in line with the JCS suggestion, a group
was convened, under the chairmanship of the writer, to study and
develop recommendations on the subject.

2. The group comprised representatives of the Director
of Security, Department of State; the Assistant Secretary of
Defense (Special Operations); the Directors of CIA, FBI, ONI, OSI,
G-2, and NSA. In addition, the group consulted with AEC on
certain technical aspects of the subject.

3. Major findings resulting from the group's study indi-
cate that:

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(e) The presumed compromise of U.S. classified information resulting from penetrations of this sort constitutes a grave problem requiring the prompt development and application of both technical and non-technical countermeasures. (In most instances such compromise is presumed, rather than established, since all of the agencies concerned have not heretofore required that damage assessments be made following discovery of such penetrations. In a few instances it has been established that U.S. classified information of a high order of sensitivity and of direct interest to several departments and agencies has been compromised through the installation of clandestine listening devices in key installations occupied by senior representatives of the U.S. Government. Illustrative of the latter

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[REDACTED]

(f) Although clandestine listening devices have not been found to be in use domestically thusfar, the subject has both foreign and domestic implications from the standpoint of: (1) safeguarding the classified information and operations of departments and agencies in both domestic and foreign areas; (2) counterespionage; (3) bringing to bear on the problem the combined capabilities, experience and information of all agencies responsible for both foreign and domestic aspects of the subject to the end of achieving a coordinated program to maximize both technical

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and nontechnical efforts to detect, neutralize, counteract and exploit such devices, thereby minimizing their threat to U.S. national security.

4. Appreciating the desirability of avoiding, if possible, the creation of a new mechanism to deal with the subject, the group examined the feasibility of assigning the problem to such bodies as the IIC, the IAC, the USCIB, and the USEB. Its examination reflected that there is no joint Governmental body suited by charter or membership to assume responsibility for achieving the development and coordinated application of the various countermeasures required to defend against this threat.

5. Accordingly, the group agreed unanimously to recommend adoption by the Council and approval by the President of the enclosed draft directive which proposes the establishment of an IIC special committee to deal with the subject and which spells out terms of reference designed to cope with the problem. The draft directive has been approved for submission to the Council by:

The Director of Security, Department of State
The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations)
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice
The Director of Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Director of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force
The Director of the National Security Agency.


J. Patrick Coyne

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July 31, 1956

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Draft Directive Establishing The
NAC SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE COUNTERMEASURES

On the recommendation of the National Security Council, pursuant to the provisions of Section 101 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the President hereby authorizes and directs that:

1. There be established under the National Security Council a Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (hereinafter referred to as the Committee) which shall act in accordance with the provisions of this Directive.

2. The Committee shall be composed of one representative of each of the following: The Secretary of State; The Secretary of Defense; The Director of Central Intelligence; The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation; The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army; The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy; The Director of Special Investigations, Department of the Air Force; and The Director of the National Security Agency.

3. The heads of other departments and agencies (e.g., the Atomic Energy Commission) shall participate in the activities of the Committee to the extent required by the Committee in carrying out its responsibilities and shall lend such support as may be made available within their respective capabilities. A representative of the National Security Council, the NSC Representative on Internal Security shall participate as an observer and adviser in all meetings of the Committee.

4. It shall be the responsibility of the Committee:

a. To conduct a continuing study and review of the domestic and foreign aspects of the threat to the security of classified defense information of the United States presented by the installation and operation of clandestine technical surveillance devices in quarters or facilities occupied or used by personnel of the United States Government.

b. To establish and coordinate policies with respect to countering such threat, for the purpose of insuring:

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(1) Coordination, and a continuing exchange of information, with respect to research and development, technical equipment, security indoctrination and training (both technical and non-technical), search techniques and other related aspects of countermeasures to defend against clandestine technical surveillance devices.

(2) The establishment by departments and agencies of procedures to be followed upon the discovery of such devices, including prompt notification thereof to the heads of interested departments and agencies, as well as exploitation by the agencies concerned.

(3) Prompt notification to the Committee concerning the discovery or suspected presence of such devices, and a damage report on the extent and nature of known or presumed compromise of U.S. classified defense information, for coordinated consideration of the effect upon the national security.

c. To resolve conflicts that may arise in the implementation of policies relating to countermeasures designed to meet the threat described in Paragraph 4. a., above, with a view to instituting and maintaining effective coordination among United States departments and agencies primarily concerned.

d. To review the extent to which disclosures concerning clandestine technical surveillance devices or countermeasures thereto have been made by the United States Government to foreign governments or international organizations in which the U.S. Government participates and to establish policies and procedures concerning such disclosures.

5. The Committee shall meet once each month or more often as may be necessary to effect full compliance with the terms of this Directive.

6. The Chairman of the Committee shall be elected annually by majority vote. Other decisions of the Committee and policies established pursuant to the provisions of this Directive, shall require unanimous agreement of the members. Questions of policy upon which the Committee may fail to reach agreement in pursuance of its assigned responsibilities as set forth in this Directive shall be promptly referred to the National Security Council for resolution.

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7. The Committee shall submit annual progress reports to the National Security Council, and in the interim shall submit to the NSC any reports or recommendations respecting policy matters falling within the scope of this Directive which may require consideration by the Council.

8. Secretariat services shall be supplied by the members of the Committee.

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